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THE NEW TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION:
A FIRST ASSESSMENT
Introduction*
European), a failure (L’Echo), a betrayer of ambitions
(De Standaard), a result that nobody wanted
(Libération), a wound leaving Europe disabled (Le
Soir). In such a mood one would be eager hastily to
throw away in the stream the failing EU and its
unfinished Treaty. However, this would amount to
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Wisdom
does not advise anybody to do so but rather to compare
how clean the baby has become even though he still
has a foot in the stream. Therefore, this text distances
itself on purpose from the heated debate in order to
compare the European Community – i.e. the First
Pillar of the European Union – before and after
Amsterdam.
After Amsterdam, one might easily be induced to
think that EU Member States should have better
obeyed an American proverb instructing us never to
swap horses when crossing a stream. Indeed, whereas
the main stream the IGC had been requested to cross
was the adaptation of the EU institutions for the next
enlargement, Member States put forward too many
conditions or ‘swaps’ for both their representation and
their capacity to act in the institutions of an enlarged
European Union. The resulting failure to agree and the
drowning of the necessary institutional reforms has
focused the attention of a large part of the European
Press. ‘Amsterdam’ has been judged a can of worms,
a shamble and an irrelevance for Europe’s needs (the
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The Amsterdam Summit of the European Council
on 16 and 17 June this year was awaited with great
anticipation. With the prospect of enlargement in
sight, the institutions and the decision-making
procedures of the European Union needed to be
revised whilst maintaining a careful balance
between flexible integration on the one hand and
social and political legitimacy on the other hand.
For this reason, the Member States submerged
themselves in a long bargaining process, which
has resulted in a text larded with political
compromises.
The European Institute of Public Administration
organized a Euregional afternoon seminar on the
outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference;
the seminar was held on 3 July in Maastricht. The
principal speaker of the afternoon was Professor
Franklin Dehousse, who not only teaches at the
University of Liège and the College of Europe in
Bruges, but who has also acted as the IGC Special
Representative of the Belgian Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Professor Dehousse was thus in an excellent
position to evaluate the outcome of the difficult
negotiations.
One of his main remarks concerned the virtual
absence of a coherent approach in the Treaty and
the widespread use of protocols. Even though the
new Treaty has established a consolidated
cooperation between the Member States, the
attempted institutional reform cannot be regarded,
according to him, as much more than a ‘small
step’. Nevertheless, Dehousse’s diagnosis is that
progress has been made into the right direction,
and that the European Union is brought closer to
the citizen.
Below, you will find a first analysis of parts of the
draft Treaty by three EIPA Faculty members who
also presented their views during the IGC-afternoon.1
Due to the publication date of this EIPASCOPE
issue, their comments naturally concern the draft in
circulation prior to the date of signing due to take
place in Amsterdam in October 1997.
____________________
* By the three subsequent authors3
‘Where there is much light,
the shadow is deep...’ (Goethe)
Progress in the field of employment and social
policies has been advertised as a major achievement of
the Intergovernmental Conference. Behind the dazzling
lights announcing the new chapter on employment and
the integration of the social chapter, there seems
however to be a less bright reality. As far as the
instrument to act in favour of employment is concerned
(new chapter VIa EC Treaty, articles 109n-109s), two
elements dim the potential effects of the Community’s
new competence. First, the essential instruments at the
disposal of the Community will be recommendations
and guidelines to Member States, i.e. not excessively
productive economic tools. The possibility of using
incentive measures does exist, yet the pilot projects
they can give rise to are restricted to exchanges
between Member States of information, practices and
approaches towards employment, i.e. still no direct
actions in favour of employment. The added value of
this title is rather dubious if one considers that the EU
already made the relevant recommendations to Member
States in 1993 by adopting the Delors White Paper on
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. Second,
the decision-making procedures set up for such weak
decisions involve a maze of administrative and political
processes. Before the Council can for example issue
guidelines to Member States, it needs to await work
being completed on no less than seven documents : a
joint annual report by the Council and the Commission;
conclusions of the European Council; a Proposal from
the Commission; reports from the European Parliament,
the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee
of Regions and the newly established Employment
Committee.
As regards the social policy of the European Union,
the light is shed on the integration into the Treaty of the
contents of the Social Chapter signed by 14 Member
States in Maastricht. This agreement has given birth to
two Directives on European works councils and parental
leave which do not apply to Great Britain. The
integration of the Chapter into the Treaty is operated
by revising articles 117 to 119 EC so as to incorporate
the articles of the Social Chapter. However, this
improvement might be of value to the citizens of Great
Britain but does not represent any progress for the
citizens of the other 14 Member States. In fact, the
articles of the Social Chapter are included in the
Treaty without extension of the qualified majority to
provisions requiring unanimity. Furthermore, the fields
where the 14 were prohibited from acting are also
excluded from any EU action in the new Treaty; this
exclusion relates to pay, the right of association, the
right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. By
retaining, in particular, under the unanimity rule, the
two provisions regarding the protection of workers
when their employment contract is terminated, and the
financial contributions for promotion of employment
and job creation, the EU does not seem to pay any great
attention to its legitimacy in a period of social agitation.
There are however two noticeable, although
halfhearted, improvements.2 First, the codecision will
apply to the provisions requiring qualified majority
and contained in Article 118.1. However, codecision
will not apply to Article 118.2 containing the provisions
requiring unanimity, nor will it apply to Article 118b
whereby the Council may decide to transform into a
Community act the agreement reached among social
partners. Within this procedure, referred to as the
social dialogue, the European Parliament is not even
consulted. The second halfhearted improvement resides
in the fact that Article 119 on the principle of equal pay
for men and women shall not prevent Member States
from maintaining or adopting specific measures of
positive discrimination in favour of the under-
represented sex. Here however, the Treaty is knocking
on an already open door. Indeed, the fact that such
measures of positive discrimination should be specific,
as opposed to automatic and general, has already been
recognized by the Court of Justice since its judgement
in the Kalanke case.
‘Time shall unfold what plaited cunning
hides...’ (Shakespeare’s King Lear)
The stream the EU did not manage to cross has been
described by the IGC negotiators as the institutional
Bermuda triangle. The three inseparable institutional
corners of the triangle which led the negotiators off
track have been the number of European
Commissioners, the reweighting of the qualified
majority as provided in Article 148.2 EC, and the
extension of the scope of the qualified majority to a
significant number of provisions requiring a unanimous
vote. The failure to agree on these three interlinked
institutional issues has been officialized in the Treaty
by a special protocol on the institutions which aims at
setting the rules only for a later institutional adaptation
of the EU to enlargement. The Protocol provides in
Article 1 that as soon as the next new Member State
joins the EU, the Commission shall comprise one
representative for each Member State, provided that
the weighting of the votes in the Council has been
modified in order notably to compensate the larger
Member States which will be required to relinquish
their second Commissioner. The Protocol then provides
in Article 2 that, before the sixth enlargement, an IGC
must be convened in order to ‘carry out a comprehensive
review of the provisions of the Treaties on the
composition and functioning of the institutions’.
Several comments and future scenarios (seven in all)
for EU institutions can be drawn from this polymorphic
Protocol and other related provisions.
First, an agreement on the reweighting of votes in
the Council will be effective when the first enlargement
enters into force; the number of Commissioners will
then equal the number of Member States of the EU, as
no Member State can retain two Commissioners and
every Member State is entitled under Article 157 to4
appoint one Commissioner.
Second, if no agreement were to be reached on the
reweighting of votes when the first enlargement
becomes effective, the Commission would sub-
sequently retain the two Representatives designated
by the larger Member States since the limitation of the
Protocol would not apply.
Third, a general IGC could be convened as early as
the first enlargement instead of a simple or ‘mini’ IGC
revising only the weighting of votes as provided by
Article 1 of the Protocol on institutions.3 The intention
to reopen the debate on the scope of the qualified
majority in a general IGC as early as the first
enlargement arises not so much from an interpretation
of Article 1 of the Protocol but, indeed, from an entire
political reinterpretation on the part of those Member
States which felt disadvantaged by the non-agreement
on the institutional issues on the eve of enlargement.
Belgium in particular has pressed for such a
reinterpretation of Article 1 by submitting a declaration
to be inserted in the draft Treaty for signature in
October in Amsterdam. The result of such a scenario
would be a double IGC taking place first at the time of
the first enlargement, and then after the fifth
enlargement as provided for by article 2 of the Protocol.
According to this scenario, both IGCs would discuss
the three corners of the ‘Bermuda triangle’.
Fourth, it should be mentioned that in the event of
non-agreement on the reweighting of votes, the Council
may still use Article 157 EC, which is explicitly
covered by Article 1 of the Protocol and provides that
‘the number of Members of the Commission may be
altered by the Council acting unanimously’, in order to
allow one or more Member States to give up their
second Commissioner as a gesture of goodwill.
Fifth, the revised Article 137 EC which restricts
the total number of Members of the European
Parliament to 700 might also need to be reconsidered
before the general IGC scheduled to take place before
the sixth enlargement by Article 2 of the Protocol.
Indeed, one can imagine that the accession of less than
5 new Member States brings the total number of
Members of the European Parliament above the ceiling
of 700, consequently contravening Article 137 EC.
Sixth, if the six accessions which have been
considered positively by the Commission were to take
place simultaneously, all the abovementioned scenarios
would not be worth mentioning since Article 2 of the
Protocol provides in this case for a general IGC.
Seventh, in its communication on Agenda 2000 the
European Commission signalled that a multiple
accession could indeed take place and lead to a general
IGC. According to the Commission, an IGC should be
convened as soon as possible after the year 2000 to
prepare the Union for enlargement by means of far-
reaching reforms of the institutional provisions of the
Treaty, including the generalized introduction of
qualified majority voting. Because, following the
terms of the Protocol, such an IGC is required only
after five enlargements, and because the year 2000 is
so close, it can be interpreted that the Commission is
calling for the EU to prepare for a multiple enlargement.
Once again, this scenario of multiple accession would
prevent the EU from having to face all the possible
stages involved in the ‘Bermuda’ Protocol.
‘Since we cannot get what we like,
let us like what we get...’ (Spanish Proverb)
Despite the non-agreement on institutional adaptation
to enlargement, a number of improvements to the
functioning of the European Union brought in by the
Amsterdam Treaty need to be presented. First, we
know that, due to this failure to agree, qualified
majority voting (QMV) has not been extended to
crucial parts of the Community’s competences, namely
the right to move and reside freely, the coordination of
social security schemes, parts of the environmental
policy and, in particular measures of a fiscal nature,
fiscal provisions or culture. However, QMV has been
extended to fields which might witness, or have already
experienced, important Community actions. These
fields include Research and Development, employment
guidelines and incentives measures, social exclusion,
equal treatment of men and women, public health,
transparency, the countering of fraud, outermost regions
and customs cooperation.
Second, the European Parliament turns out to be
the kingpin. Not only will it need to approve the
nomination of the President of the Commission, but
essentially will it become co-legislator in almost all
fields of Community action since the cooperation
procedure has disappeared – except for one particular
phase of monetary policy. The Parliament continues
of course to be consulted only in some restricted areas,
notably the employment and social fields, but nobody
would have expected that its legislative powers would
be upgraded to such an extent. By being the only party
truly to believe in the probability of an extension of the
codecision procedure, the Parliament confirms French
scientist Pasteur’s observation that chance favours the
prepared mind. Another improvement relating to
codecision is its simplification; by giving up the stage
of the third reading in the Parliament, the simplification
aims at speeding up the procedure which has currently
lasts an average of approximately one year.
The third improvement concerns other specific
aspects of the EU institutions. The Economic and
Social Committee will be consulted on social matters,
employment measures and public health. The
Committee of Regions will be consulted on social
matters, employment measures, vocational training,
public health, environment and transport. The
competence of the Court of Auditors essentially extends
to the right to refer to the Court of Justice. As regards
the Commission, the powers and autonomy of its
President will be strengthened by two elements.
Whereas a new first subparagraph in article 163 EC
confers the political guidance of the Commission to its
President, a Declaration grants the President broad
discretion in the allocation of tasks within the College5
of Commissioners.
A fourth improvement, even though its added
value is lower, concerns the constitutionalization into
Protocols of several rules already in place for the
functioning of the European Union. Let us mention
inter alia the Protocol on the application of the
principles of subsidiarity which cements into the Treaty
the  modus operandi reached so far between EU
institutions and Member States; the Protocol on
transparency which makes official the right for citizens
to access documents and calls upon the institutions to
elaborate further their own rules of procedure in this
regard; a Protocol which solves the long standing
contention regarding the Institutions’ permanent
locations; a Protocol on the quality of Community
legislation; and finally a Protocol which clarifies the
role National Parliaments are entitled to play and in
particular their right of information during the process
of decision-shaping.
‘Everything should be made as simple as
possible, but not simpler...’ (Einstein)
Although some provisions could have been listed
above as improvements, they need to be distinguished
for their complexity and the legal uncertainty they
generate. First, the Treaty opens the door to so-called
flexibility or closer cooperation while putting in place
however a number of hurdles before some Member
States are allowed to undergo legislative action by
using the Union institutions and procedures. Specific
hurdles can be found in article 5a EC whereas general
hurdles applying also to closer cooperation in the
Third Pillar are listed in article K15 of a the new title
VIa Treaty on European Union (TEU). Closer
cooperation needs for example to be a measure of last
resort and to preserve the acquis communautaire as
well as the Community policies. Problems will arise
when checking whether a proposal for closer
cooperation, which will first need a triggering vote by
qualified majority, will obey such hurdles or not. It is
indeed hard to predict how the criteria of last resort
will be defined, whether in terms of time or urgency.
Furthermore, it is hard to think of any flexible measure
that would not affect either the acquis or a Community
policy at the current level of European integration.
The choice will have to be made between legal
formalism and political pragmatism.
Further queries will probably arise when
implementing the new articles Fa and 236 EC. These
articles can be used to suspend the rights of a Member
State, including its voting rights, should it breach the
principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and the
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law as provided
in Article F.1. Since this breach requires to be
acknowledged by the Council meeting in the
composition of the Heads of State or Government, it is
likely that one will witness serious interferences
between legal and political considerations. Moreover,
since this suspension procedure does not apply to
paragraph 2 of Article F which obliges the Union to
respect the European Convention on Human Rights,
one does not really know how this obligation will be
applied in practice. Similar queries apply to the new
paragraph of the preamble of the TEU whereby the
Union declares its attachment to fundamental social
rights as defined by the UN Social Charter of 1961 and
the Community Charter of 1989. Indeed, the fact that
several national Constitutions guarantee these rights
even better than with a preamble, does not mean that
the fundamental social rights are in fact enforced.
A third legal mystery surrounds the new article 7d
EC. This article intends to protect the particular nature
and mission of public services. The problem is that it
does not really say more on this issue than article 90
EC or recent proposed EC legislation in the field, and
it is surely less explicit than the Case Law on the
liberalization of public services. It is uncertain as to
what extent the European Court of Justice will be
challenged by Member States to take into account this
new article in the process of further liberalization.
A fourth legal attraction is the Declaration to the
Final Act on sport. It is indeed hard to foresee the
effects of a call made to the ‘bodies’ of the European
Union to ‘listen’ to sports associations and to give
‘special consideration to the particular characteristics
of amateur sport. It is of course dubious what exactly
the notion of listening should mean in the EC decision-
making process; it is further uncertain whether, applied
‘to the letter’, such Declaration would not put into
question parts of the judgement of the European Court
of Justice in the Bosman case relating to the free
movement of football players.
To conclude this section on the complex
improvements, it should be noted that a number of
Community instruments which were expected to be
simplified, were actually not altered in Amsterdam.
First, Declaration No. 16 of the Maastricht Treaty,
which instructed the IGC to establish a more coherent
hierarchy between the different Community legal
acts, has not been carried out. Second, Article 113 has
not been modified so as to make the Common
Commercial Policy more coherent. In particular, the
external competence of the Community in the fields of
services and intellectual property challenged by the
European Court of Justice in its opinion 1/94 has not
been recognized in the new Treaty; according to the
new fifth paragraph of Article 113 EC this competence
can only be granted in the future by a unanimous
decision of the Council. Third, the simplification of
the complex comitology procedure whereby the
Commission executes implementing legislative powers
under the varying supervision of Member States, has
been postponed, by a Declaration to the final Act, until
the end of 1998 and it is proposed that the Commission
be requested to then deliver on this matter.
‘The entire ocean is affected by
a pebble...’ (Blaise Pascal)
The new Treaty on European Union is studded with a
plethora of Protocols and Declarations. The problem6
with this mosaic of safety nets is twofold. First, some
unilateral or combined moves by Member States are
not even necessary because they demand something
already recognized by EC Law. Second, some of these
instruments aim at safeguarding minor if not trivial
interests compared to the constitutional nature of the
Treaty. Declarations and Protocols not yet mentioned
earlier intend notably to protect or favour island
regions and overseas countries or territories, services
such as general economic services, public service
broadcasting, public credit institutions in Germany;
voluntary service activities; animal welfare; churches
and confessional organizations. Although it is
legitimate that Member States hold specific interests,
one may regret that the new Treaty has been chosen as
the battlefield for safeguarding interests perceived as
under threat. The Amsterdam phenomenon of
‘protocolarization’ certainly has disrupting and
polluting effects upon the Treaty.
Conclusion
More than previous Treaties in the process of European
integration, the First Pillar of the Amsterdam Treaty is
the result of a compromise. On one hand, the
compromise simultaneously stages positive upgradings
of the Maastricht Treaty including democratic
improvements, the extension of qualified majority
voting, a procedure for closer cooperation, a capacity
to act in favour of employment, and references to
fundamental rights, social rights and transparency. On
the other hand, one may regret not only that some of
these achievements are modest, simply cosmetic, offset
by protocolarization or wrapped up in legal uncertainty,
but also that the same compromise stages the nebulous
postponement of the institutional adaptation of the EU
to enlargement. The European Union was thus given
a bonus in Amsterdam but it is still sitting surrounded
by a mist preventing it from wisely considering
enlargement. As a compromise, the new Treaty on
European Union offers, after Maastricht, an improved
umbrella but a poor roof for an enlarged Union.
From Maastricht to Amsterdam: Was it Worth the Journey for CFSP?
Sophie Vanhoonacker
Senior Lecturer, EIPA
As in 1991, the question of the further development of
Europe’s foreign policy capacities has once again
been high on the agenda of the 1996-1997 Inter-
governmental Conference. The high expectations of
1991 following the transformation in Maastricht of
European Political Cooperation (EPC) into CFSP had
not been fulfilled and following Europe’s poor
performance in the Yugoslavian crisis, European
citizens did not hide their disappointment. They have
increasingly seen the European Union as a paper tiger
incapable of acting and not able to take care of its own
security. Whether the amendments introduced in
Amsterdam will be able to change that image, remains
however very much the question.
During the fifteen months of negotiations, the IGC
in the area of foreign and security policy has primarily
focused on four questions: the issue of introducing
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV); the introduction of
the principle of flexibility; amendments with regard to
security and defence; and the question of institutional
changes.
The debate on the use of unanimity versus QMV is
as old as that on European foreign policy cooperation
itself. While for some countries like France and the
United Kingdom, the area of foreign policy is
considered too sensitive to transfer full sovereignty to
the European level, others like Germany, Italy and the
Benelux countries for example, judge that the
intergovernmental approach only constitutes an
intermediary phase, and estimate that the only way to
overcome the paralysis in CFSP is to move to decision-
making by QMV .
The Treaty of Amsterdam leaves no doubt as to
which school of thought has prevailed. Decision-
making by unanimity remains the general rule in the
field of CFSP (Art. J.13). A special or reinforced
Qualified Majority (at least 10 Member States in
favour) is possible but only for implementing common
strategies, joint actions or common positions which,
before, have already been adopted by unanimity.
There is an additional safeguard providing the
possibility for a Member State to oppose a decision by
QMV ‘for important and stated reasons of national
policy’. The Council can then bring the matter before
the European Council which has to decide by unanimity.
In practice this means that a Member State which
opposes a decision by QMV can always use its veto.
Member States also maintain their veto for decisions
having military or defence implications (Art. J.13.2).
The most important novelty for the decision-making
process in the Second Pillar is the possibility for
Member States to abstain, i.e. not to participate in
certain decisions under CFSP. In the event of such
positive or constructive abstention, the Member State(s)
in question are not bound by the EU decision, but the
Treaty asks them not undertake any action conflicting
with or impeding EU action. For flexibility to apply,
there has however to be a critical mass of countries
supporting the decision in question and the Treaty
stipulates that those abstaining should not represent